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UNOFFICIAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND
FISCAL DISCIPLINE IN HUNGARY
AS MIRRORED IN CONSECUTIVE ENTERPRISE
SURVEYS ON TAX BEHAVIOUR
BY ANDRÁS SEMJÉN AND ISTVÁN JÁNOS TÓTH
Abstract
The paper focuses on a segment of the hidden economy, i. e. on unofficial
(unreported) economic activities of registered medium and large enter-
prises in Hungary. First we place the problem into a broader context, then
we delimit those segments of unofficial economic activities our surveys are
able to catch.
The data from our 1996,1998 and 2001 enterprise surveys put us into a
unique position: we are able to analyse the dynamics of some components
of the hidden economy during the transition. Our surveys focus on the eve-
ryday practice of tax evasion and tax avoidance (including some of the
various methods and techniques enterprises use to diminish their tax li-
abilities). These methods include underreporting activities and revenues,
exaggerating (over-reporting) costs, using outsourcing to small subcon-
tractors in order to provide “tax-efficient” labour,  tailor-made remu-
neration packages to take advantage of loopholes, etc. While some of the
tax planning methods clearly remain within the realm of legality, others
may include tax dodging of the illegal kind. The borderlines between
avoidance and evasion are necessarily blurred. We also deal with some
other aspects of fiscal discipline and tax compliance and enterprise be-
haviour (tax delays, tax litigation, etc .).
Our data unanimously support the hypothesis that the importance of
unofficial economic activity of registered medium and large enterprises
radically diminished since 1996. As we also have information about the
selected enterprise group’s opinion on the unofficial activities of their
business partners and main domestic competitors, our data enable us to
generalise this finding to the whole registered business sector.
SEMJÉN ANDRÁS – TÓTH ISTVÁN JÁNOS
A NEM BEVALLOTT (NEMHIVATALOS) GAZDASÁGI TEVÉKENYSÉGEK
ÉS A FISKÁLIS FEGYELEM ALAKULÁSA MAGYARORSZÁGON
AZ ADÓZÁSI MAGATARTÁSRA VONATKOZÓ
 ISMÉTELT VÁLLALATI FELMÉRÉSEK TÜKRÉBEN
Összefoglaló
Az alábbi tanulmányban egy 2001 novemberében 300 közepes és nagy ma-
gyarországi cég körében lefolytatott vállalati empirikus vizsgálat eredmé-
nyei alapján a vizsgálat vállalati körben a rejtett gazdaság súlyának és a
cégek adózási magatartásának alakulását vizsgáljuk. A felvétel eredményeit
összehasonlítjuk a megegyező mintán és módszerekkel 1996-ban és 1998-
ban lefolytatott vizsgálatok eredményeivel.
Kimutatjuk, hogy érezhetően javult a közepes és nagy cégek adózási fe-
gyelme 1998 és 2001 között, valamint jelentősen csökkent e cégek körében a
rejtett gazdaság különböző megnyilvánulásainak súlya és elterjedtsége. Ez a
tendencia egyrészt illeszkedik korábbi kutatásaink által kimutatott – az 1994
és 1998 közötti időszakra vonatkozó – folyamatokba, másrészt aláhúzza
azon empirikus és elméleti eredmények érvényességét, amelyek szerint a
poszt-kommunista országokban a transzformációs visszaesés lezáródásával
csökkenni kezdett a rejtett gazdaság – korábban növekvő – súlya. Vélemé-
nyünk szerint ezt a folyamatot a kedvező konjunkturális kilátások, a vállalati
szférán belül a külföldi tőke térhódítása, a vállalatok üzleti kapcsolatainak
átalakulása, valamint a kormányzati szabályozási hibák ritkulása és az
adóigazgatás ellenőrzési hatékonyságának növekedése segíti elő.

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on a segment of the underground or black economy,
i. e. on unofficial (unreported) economic activities of enterprises in Hun-
gary. Our aim was to observe and present some changes in the share of an
important  segment of the black economy over time. There are many possi-
ble ways to do this (econometric analysis using existing statistical data,
empirical testing of theoretical models, field work, survey, etc.) Here we
are going to present some survey data from three consecutive surveys.
Other approaches can certainly be as useful as this one. and perhaps far
more elegant. However, we believe that survey data may present the re-
searcher with such wealth of empirical information and evidence that is
hardly available form other sources, making this approach useful and re-
warding.
First let us place the problem of unofficial economic activities or the
concept of the black economy into a broader context. This might prove
useful, as it can help us in delimiting those segments of unofficial eco-
nomic activities our surveys and analysis are able to catch.. Many of the
terms used below in Figure 1 (and throughout the paper) may seem to the
reader somewhat vague and/or overlapping, and different authors may use
them with slightly different meaning. We mostly use here these terms in
accordance with the definitions given in Thomas, 1992. We have only very
little space here to go into details regarding the definition and measure-
ment of the main concepts,  however, some clarification is certainly needed
to justify our distinctions between economic transactions or sectors char-
acterised to a lesser or greater extent by some degree of informality, ir-
regularity or even illegality.
The following clarification covers only the main concepts depicted in
Figure 1. The important characteristic of the household sector is that its
output is produced and distributed within the household and not traded on
the market. The lack of market transactions make it difficult to evaluate its
contribution to welfare and so it is mostly excluded from national accounts
(or at best only partially imputed). Voluntary organisations (like some
clubs) also may be involved in activities that might constitute production
although not traded in the market. These also do not fall inside the
“official” production boundary and are mostly left out from the national
accounts. The concept of the informal sector is “an artifice of accounting
convention” (Cowell, 1990, p. 13): it includes some kind of household
production and some barter transactions; it encompasses small-scale pro-
2duction in the traditional sector. Though the output of the informal sector
is sold (on the streets) or barter-traded, and there is no theoretical reason
why its output should not be included in “official production” or the na-
tional accounts, it is largely ignored due to the difficulties of data collec-
tion. Although the goods and services forming the output of the irregular
sector are perfectly legal, the way these are produces and/or distributed
always involves some level of illegality (like tax evasion; avoidance of
some regulations, especially minimum wage and factory safety regulations;
social security fraud). The usual intention of authorities regarding this
sector is to include it in the regular sector, thus stop the fraud and collect
the unpaid taxes. This makes it completely different . from the criminal
sector which consists of activities (goods and services) leading to illegal
outputs (e.g. theft, drugs, burglary, kidnap, blackmail, in some countries
prostitution). The authorities usually want to stop or curtail such activities
and are not interested in including them in the tax base.
Figure 1
Scope of the black economy: some economic concepts
 relevant for understanding unofficial economic activities
Note: This rough schematic description is based on Figure 2.1 of Cowell, 1990. For the
definition of terms used here see also Thomas, 1992.
3From the three different subsets of black economy displayed in Figure 1
we are going to limit ourselves in the following to two only, namely some
part of the productive irregular sector (irregular economic activities of
registered firms) and to a far more limited extent to some phenomena be-
longing to the “unproductive” irregular sector. (Parts to be dealt with here
are set in cursive in Figure 1) We are not going to deal with the unofficial
economic activities of unregistered economic agents. We will not deal
with the criminal sector, i. e. the economic aspects of “ordinary” criminal
activities1 (e.g. smuggling, drug trafficking, etc.) either. However, our
analysis may include some (but not all) illegal activities (belonging to the
“irregular sector” according to Thomas’s categorisation) that have detri-
mental effects on public property or public revenues. Such activities do not
belong to the criminal sector as their output in itself is completely legal,
however, these activities may still belong to the realm of criminal law (e.g.
tax evasion). For technical reasons (in order to keep sample sizes reasonably
small) we will also exclude firms below a certain size or sole proprietorships
from our analysis: we will deal with large and medium-size firms only.
Our enterprise surveys focus on the everyday practice of tax evasion and
tax avoidance (including some of the various methods and techniques en-
terprises use to diminish their tax liabilities). These methods include un-
derreporting activities and revenues, exaggerating (over-reporting) costs,
using outsourcing to small subcontractors in order to provide “tax-
efficient” labour, tailor-made remuneration packages to take advantage of
tax loopholes, etc. While some of the tax planning methods clearly remain
within the realm of legality, others may include tax dodging of the illegal
kind. The borderlines between avoidance and evasion are necessarily
blurred. We also deal with some other aspects of fiscal discipline and tax
compliance (tax delays, tax litigation, etc .). The data from our 1996,1998
and 2001 enterprise surveys have put us into a unique position: we are able
to analyse the dynamics of some components of the underground economy
during the transition.
                    
1 Activities with illegal output, or activities threatening the life, safety, freedom or prop-
erty rights of individuals.
41. THE SAMPLE
Our 2001 November survey was already the third one in a row of enter-
prise surveys investigating registered medium-size and large businesses in
Hungary. These surveys focused on the tax behaviour of medium-size and
large enterprises, and tried to identify and analyse the main factors deter-
mining enterprise behaviour in this respect. The first survey took place in
1996 November, while the second one in 1998 June2. The sampling guide-
lines for all three surveys were basically the same, so our survey data are
characterised by a level of homogeneity enabling us to analyse the dy-
namics of tax behaviour and thus investigate some components of the un-
derground economy during the transition.
Our guiding principle in sample selection for the 2001 survey was our aim
to retain the possibility of comparison with our earlier (1996 and 1998) en-
terprise surveys, to cover a wide range of economic sectors and to get infor-
mation on the behaviour of enterprises that belong to the most important
segment of the Hungarian economy (large and medium-size enterprises).
We used random samples for all of our three surveys. Enterprise addresses
for the 2001 survey were obtained from the Hungarian Central Statistical
Office (KSH), similarly to the practice followed in earlier surveys. The main
parameters of our survey samples are compared in Table 1 below.
The relevant enterprise population3 for the 2001 survey consisted of
3458 enterprises, out of which the list of enterprises to be interviewed was
selected by random sampling. The distribution of the enterprise population
and the sample is presented in Table 2 (by number of employees and sec-
tor). The test of goodness of fit (See Appendix 1) shows that the joint dis-
tribution of the survey sample by sector and the number of employees does
not differ significantly from that of the whole enterprise population, thus
no weighing was necessary. The sample can be considered representative
by sector and the number of employees.
                    
2 Questioning and the collection and processing of survey data was done by the person-
nel of the Survey department of a Budapest based social research institute specialis-
ing in opinion polls and surveys (TÁRKI).
3 Enterprises meeting our selection criteria, i. e. size (as measured by the number of em-
ployees) and sector, are the relevant cases.
5Table 1
Main parameters of the three survey samples
Time of survey 1996 November 1998 June 2001 November
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
Sectors covered Construction Construction Construction
Trade and com-
merce
Trade and com-
merce
Trade and com-
merce
Size (number of
employees)
above 50 em-
ployees
above 50 em
ployees
above 50 em-
ployees
Enterprise population 1721 3494 3458
Number of cases 293 300 301
Weighing Not needed Not needed Not needed
Place of residence
of enterprises
Budapest and
county capitols
Whole country Whole country
Fit (Representa-
tiveness)
Sector & number
of employees
Sector & number of
employees
Sector & number
of employees
 If one compares the 1996, 1998 and 2001 survey samples by ownership
types, there is a salient feature in the ownership structure that catches the
eye. Foreign ownership visibly gained ground during these years in the
ownership structure of the Hungarian economy: the share of firms in (sole
or majority) foreign ownership4 within the sample increased significantly.
Parallel with the spreading of foreign ownership the share of domestic
public (central or local government) owners and domestic corporate own-
ers lost ground in the Hungarian ownership structure. Firms with (at least
majority) foreign owners play a major role in determining the performance
of the Hungarian economy: their share in total net sales or in export sales
                    
4 That means firms registered in Hungary and either exclusively owned by foreign indi-
vidual and/or corporate owner(s), or in which the foreign individual and/or corporate
owner(s) have an ownership share above 50 percent. Strictly speaking when we men-
tion majority owners or ownership in the paper we should rather say “sole or major-
ity” or “at least majority” owner(s) or ownership throughout the text. However, for
the sake of simplicity and brevity we will frequently use only majority (domestic or
foreign) owner(s)/ownership or even more simply and plainly  just (foreign or do-
mestic) owner(s)/ownership.
6are well beyond their relative share amongst registered firms. In the 2001
sample firms owned by (at least majority) foreign owners (for the sake of
simplicity referred to as foreign owned firms) count for 33 percent of total
net sales and 58 percent of exports  (See Table 3.).
Table 2
The distribution of the relevant enterprise population
by the number of employees and sector, %
Enterprise
population
meeting selec-
tion criteria
Enterprises
in the
 sample
Sectors (2 digit NACE codes)
Food, beverages and tobacco industries (15,16) 10,8 8,3
Textile, clothes, leather and fur manufacturing (17-19) 14,5 14,6
Wood, paper, printing industries (20-22) 6,2 5,6
Chemical industry (23-25) 6,7 4,7
Manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products (26) 3,1 4,0
Metallurgy and metal procession (27,28) 9,2 7,6
Machine industry/engineering (29-35) 16,5 19,9
Other manufacturing, recycling (36,37) 3,1 3,7
Construction (45) 11,4 13,0
Trade and commerce (51,52) 18,6 18,6
Total 100,0 100,0
Employment (number of employees)
51-99 49,1 46,2
100 – 249 31,0 32,1
more than 249 19,9 22,6
Total 100,0 100,0
N 3458 301
7Figure 2
Some changes in the ownership pattern of medium-size and large
companies in selected sectors of the Hungarian economy, 1996-2001,
based on the type of (at least) majority owner(s), percent
Table 3
Share of foreign owned firms* in (expected) net sales,
exports and employment, 2001, percent
All
firms in
the
sample
N
Foreign
owned
firms* in
the sample
N
Percentage
share of
foreign
owned
firms*
Net sales
(thousand HUF)
697.3 293 231.5 78 33.2
Export revenues
(thousand HUF)
200.2 194 115.5 67 57.7
Number of employees
(thousand)
  74.1 295   19.7 80 26.6
Based on firms’ expectations in November 2001
* firms in majority or sole foreign ownership
0
10
20
30
40
50
1996 1998 2001
Hungarian individual owner foreign individual or corporate owner
Hungarian corporate owner government (public sector)
8Another salient feature of the economic trends represented in our three
subsequent surveys is the significant increase in the importance of export
markets. This is reflected in the share of firms producing for exports in the
1996–2001 period as well as in the overall share of export revenues in total
net sales. Companies within the surveyed part of the economy visibly be-
came more and more open and exposed to the world market: the share of
firms producing for export increased from its 55 percent 1996 level to 65
percent by 2001; while during the same time span the average share of ex-
port sales (revenues) in total net sales of firms producing for export in-
creased from 34 percent even more markedly, to 48 percent.
2. SURVEY RESULTS
2.1. Business climate and prospects
Already back in 1998 it was obvious from the analysis of survey data that
enterprises felt a significant improvement of the business climate in gen-
eral. And indeed, the economic growth in Hungary was at a local peak in
the second quarter of 1998 with a remarkably high 5.4 percent growth rate
(Cf. Figure 4). That was also reflected in the high level of the interviewed
firms’  subjective  assessment  of their business  position,  expectations and
Figure 3
 Share of firms with export sales in the sample and the ratio
 of their export revenues to their total net sales, 1996-2001, percent
30
40
50
60
70
1996 1998 2001
share of firms producing for export export ratio in net sales
9Figure 4
 Quarterly GDP growth rates for Hungary, 1996-2002
(same quarter of previous year = 100 percent)
98
100
102
104
106
108
1996
Q1
Q3 1997
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Q1
Q3 1999
Q1
Q3 2000
Q1
Q3 2001
Q1
Q3 2002
Q1
prospects, as compared to the same indicators in 1996. Investment activity
became more robust and the time horizon of company planning increased
significantly, and company balance-sheets also improved a lot during this
two year. In the 2001 November survey, however, expectations and opin-
ions of company executives on their business situation and prospects sug-
gest a somewhat more restrained attitude, although on the whole execu-
tives are still far more pleased with their business situation and optimistic
about their business prospects than they were back in 1996. No wonder, as
from the 2nd quarter of 2000 onwards quarterly growth rates have shown a
monotonously decreasing pattern. These economic trends surely must have
been reflected in the subjective indicators of business position and pros-
pects.(See Table 4.)
In an earlier paper (Tóth and Semjén, 1998) we substantiated that the
shift from recession or stagnation to positive economic growth and, paral-
lel with this shift, more favourable expectations about macroeconomic
prospects, were instrumental in diminishing the share of unofficial eco-
nomic activities (or, as such activities are frequently referred to, the hidden
economy). This, however, in no way indicates that once macroeconomic
trends and prospects start to deteriorate, there must be an automatic in-
crease in the share of the hidden economy.
10
Table 4
 Changes in expectations and opinions on business climate
and some performance indicators, 1996-2001, percent
1996 1998 2001
Expectations on investment dynamics
Increase 19.5 44.7 32.8
No change 49.8 34.8 46.8
Decrease 30.7 20.4 20.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 277 296 299
Operating balance forecasts for the year of the survey
Profit 65.4 82.1 80.0
Zero balance   5.5   2.7 12.0
Loss 29.1  15.2   8.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 289 295 300
Time horizont of business planning
No plans    1.7     1.7     1.7
Less than 12
months
   8.3     3.9     6.0
1-2 years   36.1   30.7   39.5
3-5 years   28.8   31.5   25.2
More than 5
years
  25.0   32.2   27.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 288 297 301
Incidence of export sales
Yes 54.6 61.2 65.3
No 45.4 38.8 34.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 293 300 291
Share of export revenues in
net sales* Export ratio 33.9 45.8 48.3
N 159 178 190
* Only for companies with export sales
Although there has obviously been a marked deterioration in the growth
performance of the Hungarian economy in 2000–2001, economic growth
only slowed down somewhat but always persisted. The deterioration of
growth rates that started around mid-2000 was, on the one hand, not dra-
matic enough to change the long-term expectations of economic actors
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overnight, and on the other hand it was perceived by many economic ac-
tors as a temporary phenomenon mostly due to some passing recession in
our main export markets or fluctuations in the business cycle. Thus it may
seem rational to expect that the deterioration of the growth rate will come
to a halt soon and then the economy will flourish again, returning to a
somewhat higher and more stable growth rate. And this is far from being
the only reason that can account for the lack of any necessary automatic re-
sponse to business climate deterioration, as far as financial discipline or
the relative share of unofficial activities are concerned. It is more than ob-
vious that such institutional factors as legal and/or administrative changes
in the tax system or tax administration5 do have a significant impact on the
share of unofficial economic activities, and can compensate for some unfa-
vourable changes in business climate.
Thus changes in survey data for the 1998–2001 period cannot be ex-
pected to indicate definitively any increase in the share of unofficial ac-
tivities within the economy, although such conclusion cannot be ruled out
a priori. However, in some fields or aspects that are more sensitive or vul-
nerable to short-term fluctuations in the business cycle there can be some
negative effects due to the slowdown.
2.2. Tax compliance and contractual discipline
The 2001 survey data on tax compliance or tax discipline seem to support
our previous hypothesis (that the economic slowdown may have some
negative effects on enterprise behaviour regarding the choice between offi-
cial and unofficial or reported and unreported economic activities, or the
punctuality of tax payments) to a certain extent. Although the gradual im-
provement of contractual discipline6 amongst large and medium-size com-
                    
5 Such changes in Hungary are analysed at length in Semjén, 2001
6 Contractual discipline covers the discipline of payments and delivery. Here we mostly
concentrate on the discipline of payments. The discipline of delivery also shows an
improving trend, however, its 2001 level is far below the level of discipline of pay-
ments. The share of firms reporting problems in meeting their delivery deadlines
during the last 12 months is quite high: more than one fifth (22 percent) of firms de-
livered with some delay and 2 percent did not deliver overdue items by the time of
the survey. Out of those firms that reported such problems during the last 12 months,
65 percent delivered with delays less than ten times, and 39 percent less than three
times.
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panies remained steadfast (the share of firms not meeting their contractual
payment obligations diminished steadily7 at a nearly constant rate during
the whole 1996–220 period), and the positive trend (visible improvement)
also persisted in tax discipline, i. e. there is a decrease in the share of firms
with delays in tax payments (freshly accumulated tax arrears), and other
indicators8 also show some improvement in tax compliance), the slope of
the line is somewhat broken, the speed of change is visibly smaller after
1998. (See Figure 5.)
Figure 5
Share of firms not meeting their contractual payment obligations
and firms with recently accumulated tax or social security
contribution arrears, 1996-2001, percent
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firms not meeting their contractual obligations firms with social security contribution arrears
firms with tax arrears in the previous two years
Note: Firms with (freshly accumulated)  tax arrears in the previous two years data for
2001 also contain firms with social security arrears in the previous two years. If the
relevant 2001 data  were fully comparable with earlier ones the improvement in tax
compliance might have been somewhat more pronounced than it appears here.
                    
7 By 2001 the share of firms not always meeting their contractual payment obligations
during the last 12 months fell drastically from its 17 percent level that prevailed in 1996
to 5 percent. (See the lowest line in Figure 5.) Although it can be the case that some
company executives reporting full compliance with contractual payment obligations
had a memory lapse or wanted to make a better impact by not remembering late pay-
ments and arrears, the general trend must be still valid as we have no reason to believe
that the tendency of executives to underreport late payments increased over time.
8 Some of these will be analysed in Chapter 2.3.. Our survey data also contain some other
indicators signalling the incidence of different tax evasion and avoidance techniques
that are not analysed here for the sake of brevity, although they show a similar pattern.
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Somewhat paradoxically, the punctuality of social security payments,
that was improving between 1996 and 1998, later showed a marked dete-
rioration. as the share of firms with “fresh” social security contribution ar-
rears (delays in the payment of contribution over the last 12 months) in-
creased somewhat in the 1998–2001 period, in spite of the fact that the
collection of these contribution was delegated to the tax authority in this
period (this institutional change was expected to result in better and more
efficient collection).
Delays in the payment of social security contributions (or payroll tax ar-
rears) are less common for companies with (sole or majority) foreign own-
ers then for the rest of the sample (the relevant incidence is 6.1 percent for
foreign owned firms as compared to 13.8 in the whole sample) Fiscal dis-
cipline in general (approximated here by the punctuality of tax and social
security contribution payments taken together) also seems to be better for
foreign owned firms in 2001 than the average; at the same time smaller
firms (companies with less then 100 employees) tend to perform less well
in this respect then the big ones. These results are in line with theoretical
expectations and earlier surveys; however, none of these relationships
seem to be truly significant statistically in the 2001 sample.
We can combine a subset of contractual discipline (discipline in con-
tractual payment obligations to other firms) with the concept of fiscal dis-
cipline (discipline in tax and social security contribution payments, i. e.
payment obligations to government or to the public), and thus we can cre-
ate a broader concept that can be called the discipline of payments or fi-
nancial discipline9. We can create a dummy (BFD01) in order to measure
financial discipline or rather the infringement of the discipline of pay-
ments. This dummy can take only two values:
                    
9 The term „financial discipline” was used in a similar sense by Kornai, 1993 Kornai used a
concept, imprinting, borrowed from evolutionary biology as a metaphor, when he claimed
that the rules of financial discipline must be imprinted in newly emerging private firms. „It
is most important for the new private firms to learn from the outset that they must observe
the rules of financial discipline strictly” (Cf. Kornai, 1993, p. 330). Tóth and Semjén, 1996
was the first paper to test empirically “whether the undeniable improvement in the discipline
of payments in market relations goes together with a parallel improvement of tax abidance”
(or fiscal discipline), and the same issue was also dealt with in Tóth and Semjén, 1998.
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BFD01 = 1,
if the company could not always meet in due time its pay-
ment obligations to other companies during the last 12
months,
OR
if it ever had any delay in its social security contribution
payments (“fresh” s. s. p. arrears) over this time span
OR
if it ever had “fresh”  tax arrears (delays or debts in paying
VAT, corporate income tax, local taxes, etc.)over this time
span
BFD01 = 0  otherwise.
If we use this dummy to characterise the overall financial discipline in
the subset of the Hungarian economy represented by our survey sample,
we can conclude that 46.5 percent of companies broke some or all of the
rules of discipline of payments to some extent over the previous 12
months.10 This seems quite high and may indicate that something must
have gone  wrong in the process of “imprinting” of financial discipline into
private companies11 in post-socialist Hungary (Cf. Kornai, 2001 for a more
disillusioned view). However, if we look at Figure 5 or the underlying data
in Table A2.3 of the Appendix more closely, we can conclude that the dis-
cipline of contractual payment obligations improved impressively over
time, and such obligations are relatively very rarely broken according to
the 2001 survey data, thus so far Kornai’s view seems to be supported by
this evidence. On the other hand our data concerning fiscal discipline
might tell a somewhat different story12. Although there was a marked im-
                    
10 A word of caution seems certainly warranted here. We must not forget that this dummy is a
rather rough indicator only: it certainly shows the incidence of the infringements of financial
discipline, as far as the number of its occurrence is concerned, but it contains absolutely no
information on the intensity of these infringements, or on the average level of financial dis-
cipline for those firms who were not fully compliant with our concept regarding the disci-
pline of payments. Any minor infringement of absolute compliance with payment deadlines,
whatever marginal or temporary it may be, has the same detrimental impact on the
level of this rough indicator as a  large-scale infringement of financial discipline in
all territories (private contracts, tax obligations, social security obligations).
11 See footnote 9 above, and Kornai, 1993, p. 330.
12 We challenged Kornai’s view on the role of private ownership in strengthening finan-
cial discipline in our 1996 paper (Tóth and Semjén, 1996), at least partially, regard-
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provement in tax discipline over the 1996-2001 period, and a rather mod-
erate improvement could be observed  for social security payment arrears
as well (if we presume that the deterioration observed in the second part of
this period is of temporary nature only), the incidence of the infringement
of fiscal discipline (or breaking payment obligations to government) seems
to be on a relatively high level even as late as in 2001.
Our 2001 survey results strengthen our earlier findings (cf. Tóth and
Semjén, 1996 and 1998) regarding the positive correlation between (sole
or majority) foreign ownership and financial discipline. Companies with at
least a majority foreign stake perform significantly better in this respect
than companies with “domestic” owners. While some infringement of fi-
nancial discipline could be observed in 60.3 percent of companies having
domestic companies as their exclusive or majority owners, and instances of
such infringements were also found nearly in every second company (48.8
percent is the rate of incidence) owned exclusively or with a majority stake
by domestic individuals, in the case of “foreign” firms (companies with at
least a majority foreign stake) the relevant relative incidence is only 33.7
percent. Infringement of payment obligations was more prevalent amongst
companies in the construction sector (66.7 percent) than in manufacturing
or in trade and commerce (the relative rates are 42.9 and 46.4 percents, re-
spectively. There is also some correlation between company size and fi-
nancial discipline: bigger firms tend to perform better in this respect than
the smaller ones. 53 percent of firms with less than 100 employees did not
comply fully with the strict rules of financial discipline.
2.3. Involvement of registered enterprises in the black economy
In order to catch involvement or participation in the black economy we had
to use some indirect questions and some rather sophisticated methods, as
answers to direct questions regarding a firm’s participation in the black
economy would probably be seriously distorted. We approached this sen-
sitive issue in three different ways: (i). we asked the opinion of company
executives regarding the incidence of some phenomena in the economy
that indicate participation in the black economy;.(ii) we also asked some
direct questions regarding the incidence of contracting out (the substitution
                                                                                                                                              
ing tax discipline. We were of the view that private ownership does not necessarily
strengthen financial discipline automatically as far as fiscal discipline or tax disci-
pline are also taken into consideration. Actually we went as far as to venture that „it
can probably be presumed that … private ownership in certain cases even weakens
tax discipline”.
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of subcontractors’ contracts for employment contracts) as this completely
legal method of tax planning or tax avoidance  may indicates some forms
of tax evasion for the subcontractors13 ; (iii) and finally we also used a sur-
vey method (the so called randomised response technique) specially de-
signed for estimating the incidence of sensitive or “delicate” phenomena.
This method allowed us to get a direct overall estimation on the incidence
of tax evasion for our enterprise population.
We asked company executives about their opinion on the incidence of
unreported sales (a) amongst their contractual business partners; (b)
amongst their domestic competitors, and (c) in the Hungarian economy as
a whole. There is an important difference between answers to these seem-
ingly so similar questions: while answers to question (c) are necessarily
based on some general social perceptions and stereotyping and should be
assessed with caution, answers to questions (a) and (b) are far more reli-
able as these can be based on the personal experience of company execu-
tives the firms regarding the behaviour of some other economic actors they
know personally and more directly from the everyday practice of their
business. Despite this basic theoretical difference we cannot expect an-
swers to (a) or (b) to be completely accurate or even honest14. Although
                    
13 The primary benefit of this popular and seemingly entirely legal tax planning method
for the company initiating the substitution of suppliers’ (sub)contracts for some of its
previous employment contracts lies in the reduction of total labour costs by cutting
the “social security contributions bill” of the initiating firm. However,  the shift to
subcontracting from employment would not be an attractive choice for employees
unless they could easily evade some of their taxes and social security contributions
by over-reporting material costs and underreporting their own wage costs.
14 Since company executives tend to estimate the incidence of unreported sales amongst
their contractual partners (suppliers) well below the respective levels of their estima-
tions regarding the incidence of such sales for their competitors or the economy as a
whole, one can suspect systematic distortions in their answers.  We cannot exactly
tell whether this distortion is intentional or subconscious. One can argue that this
distortion  may be due to the executives’ efforts to save the reputation of their own
firms (we cannot expect them to report a high incidence of unreported sales amongst
their suppliers, as this could be taken as indirect or circumstantial evidence on their
own willingness to buy unreportedly); on the other hand it can also be the case that
this distortion just reflects the fact that their knowledge on competitors’ behaviour is
vague and indirect as compared to their knowledge on their suppliers’ behaviour, and
thus “general” stereotypes may influence their answers on competitors, while an-
swers regarding suppliers they directly know may be less susceptible to such stereo-
typing.
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answers to such questions regarding opinions are “soft indicators” even at
their best, changes in such soft indicators over time may carry important
and valid information regarding the actual process.
Soft “opinion-type” indicators as well as indirect indicators (that could
be used to create circumstantial evidence) substantiate unanimously a sig-
nificant decrease in the scope of unofficial economic activities for large
and medium-size enterprises in Hungary over the 1996–2001 period.
Unreported sales became less and less prevalent over time in all three
“reference groups”, i. e. contractual partners (suppliers), competitors, and
the economy as a whole. This trend is well documented in Figures 6, 7 and
8 (the underlying data are presented in Table A2.4 of the Appendix).
As far as opinions regarding the prevalence of involvement in the black
economy in general are concerned, in 2001 a nearly 2/3 majority (65 per-
cent) of company executives were still of the view that unreported sales are
a frequent phenomenon in Hungary. This is certainly a relatively high fig-
ure, still it is way below its previously measured levels (81 percent in 1998
and 89 percent in 1996) that could be interpreted as indicating a nearly
universal acceptance of a negative statement on Hungarian tax morale. (Cf.
Figure 6.)
Figure 6
 Incidence of unreported sales in the Hungarian economy:
share of firms indicating the frequent occurrence
of unreported sales in the economy as a whole* ,
1996-2001, percent
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* Based on the opinion of company executives for large and medium-size enterprises
in manufacturing, construction, trade and commerce.
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Law abidance concerning the obligation of the seller to provide the pur-
chaser with a proper receipt was considered more prevalent amongst the
firms’ domestic competitors than in the Hungarian economy in general.
Although this feature was characteristic in all the three years investigated,
there was also a gradual improvement in this respect as well. While in
1996 only 43 percent of respondents were of the view that unreported sales
never occur amongst their domestic competitors (cf. Figure 7), this share
was already a bit up to 45 percent in 1998 and by 2001 it grew to 58.5 per-
cent. Parallel with this strengthening of compliance, the share of
“frequent” answers (indicating the frequent occurrence of such sales)
amongst competitors fell to 21.2 percent from 33.3 percent over the same
time span.
Figure 7
Subjective* incidence of unreported sales amongst the competitors of
the interviewed firms: the total share of „rare” and “frequent” an-
swers contrasted to “never occurred” answers, 1996-2001, percent
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* As perceived and assessed by the interviewed company executives.
At the same time the incidence of unreported sales amongst contractual
partners15 (mainly suppliers) is estimated at relatively low levels in any
                    
15 Contractual partners in general can be suppliers (including factor owners), subcontractors and custom-
ers. As firms have little direct experience concerning the behaviour of their customers in this respect, this
indicator must mainly refer to suppliers and subcontractors
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given year. As the difference between incidence data for competitors and
contractual partners is rather high, we have good reason to believe that
there is a systematic distortion in the answers. (See more about this in
footnote 13). However, the important thing here is again not the actual
share of any given answer to this question but the tendency over time. And
this tendency shows an improvement over time, similarly to the tendencies
observed for competitors or the economy as a whole.
Figure 8
Subjective* incidence of unreported sales amongst the contractual
partners** of the interviewed firms: the total share of „rare” and
“frequent” answers contrasted to “never occurred” answers,
1994*** -2001, percent
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Note: Right-hand scale  = “never occurred” answers
Left-hand scale  = “rare” + “frequent” answers
* As perceived and assessed by the interviewed company executives.
** Contractual partners here mostly mean suppliers and subcontractors..
*** 1994 data are from an empirical survey (see in McLure Jr. et al., 1995, pp 20-82.)
conducted by the same authors on a sample referring to a somewhat different enter-
prise population (focussing on smaller and medium enterprises) from that of the
three subsequent surveys. Thus – strictly speaking – the 1994 data are not fully
comparable with data from our later surveys; however we believe that despite this
fact it they are worth to include here in this figure. More rigorous readers should
neglect the 1994 data.)
As it could be observed earlier in the field of financial and fiscal disci-
pline firms with foreign owners tend to perform better than the rest as far
as involvement in the black economy or unreported sales are considered.
While 21 percent of all company executives found unreported sales a fre-
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quent phenomenon amongst their competitors, only 9 percent of foreign
company executives agreed with this view. There are also significant dif-
ferences between different sectors in this respect: Unreported sales seem to
be the most frequent amongst the competitors of companies in trade and
commerce. The estimated 39 percent share of such sales for companies in
commerce and trade indicates that this phenomenon is far more likely to
occur in this sector than in manufacturing or construction.
The general perception of an improved tax compliance and the underly-
ing decrease of unreported sales (or the involvement in the black economy
in general) that can be at least rendered likely on the basis of the above
displayed data on the subjective incidence of such sales in different subsets
of enterprises is also reflected in the firms’ perception of the damage (or
detrimental effects in their competitive position) due to their competitors’
involvement in the black economy. Compared with earlier data there is a
significant decrease in the share of those firms complaining about the det-
rimental effects of their competitors’ involvement in the black economy
either as sellers or as buyers. (Cf. Figure 9.). Companies with at least a
majority foreign stake tend to perceive the threat caused by the involve-
ment of their competitors in the black economy less dangerous than com-
panies with domestic owners. While 63 percent of companies with (at least
majority) foreign owners were of the opinion that their competitive posi-
tion is altogether unaffected by any such involvement, only 41 percent of
companies owned by domestic owners shared a similar view.
Figure 9
The impact of the competitors’ involvement in the black economy
 on the market position of the  interviewed firms, percent
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Note: The line shows a “balance-type” statistics, i. e. the difference between the respec-
tive shares of ”significant influence” and “ no influence at all” answers.
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Similarly to our earlier surveys we also used the so called randomised
response technique to estimate the share of tax evading firms in the sample
and for the selected enterprise population. According to our estimation
based on this method the share of tax evading firms in the selected enter-
prise population must not exceed 16.6 percent at the required 95 percent
level of significance. (See Appendix 3 for technical details.) For 1998 the
mean share of tax evading firms was estimated at 8.8 percent, and the (0,
22.8) interval was estimated as the possible percentage range for the share
of tax evading firms at a 95 percent level of significance. For 2001 we es-
timated a much smaller, 2.5 percent mean and a 14.1 percent variance
(nearly identical with the 14 percent variance estimated for 1998). These
estimations indicate a (0;16.6) interval for the relevant percentage range of
evading firms at the given level of significance. This means that the upper
limit of the estimated range for the share of evading firms decreased sub-
stantially over the 1998-2001 period. Although such a downward shift in
the mean and the upper limit of the range does not allow us to exclude the
possibility of an actual increase in the incidence of tax evasion in the se-
lected enterprise population with certainty, a decrease seems to be far more
likely and consistent with the given results.
Based on these results we may conclude that changes in corporate
opinions regarding the incidence of unreported sales or involvement in the
black economy are realistic and correspond to similar changes in the real
economic process. Thus our survey results are consistent with some de-
crease in the level of involvement of registered large and medium-size en-
terprises in the black economy over the 1996–2001 period. Not only the
incidence of unreported sales diminished in the economy, but the impact of
such sales on the market position of large and medium-size firms seems to
have diminished as well. It seems to be plausible to interpret our results as
empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of a decrease in the relative
share of unofficial economic activities.
2.4. Corporate opinions on tax system and tax administration
When making their decisions regarding tax compliance, avoidance or eva-
sion and selecting their level of involvement in the black or hidden econ-
omy, companies take into consideration not only the actual and expected
decisions of other economic actors regarding the same, but the actual and
the expected future behaviour and attitude of the government towards the
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hidden economy and tax administration as well. This means that in order to
understand and describe the main trends and processes in tax compliance
and unofficial economic activities it is not enough to detect some mani-
festations of the hidden economy, observe enterprise behaviour and record
changes in fiscal and financial discipline, but the behaviour of the other
actor (i. e. the government) must also be observed and analysed. by the re-
searcher.
There are several ways this can be done. One is to give a thorough
analysis of the government’s tax policy and legislation, including the main
types of taxes and the tax structure as a whole, give details on tax bases,
tax rates, tax brackets, allowances, tax credits, tax breaks, etc. (such an ap-
proach was attempted in the chapter on Hungary in McLure et al, 1995 or
Semjén, 1998 to name some examples) or another way is to attempt the
empirical analysis of the tax administration itself (see Semjén, 2001 for
this). A third and distinctively different way is to observe the corporate
perception of the government’s tax policy, to investigate enterprise opinion
on the tax system and the working of tax administration. Our surveys allow
us to elaborate somewhat this third approach. We asked several questions
regarding the interviewed corporate executives’ opinion about tax policy
and tax administration. We also tried to ask details about their experience
regarding the work of tax administration.
If we take a closer look at the survey results presented in the Appendix,
we can conclude that according to company executives the stability and
transparency of the Hungarian tax system improved a lot over time. While
in 1996-ban only 3 percent of company executives thought that tax rules
change only “when necessary”, by 2001 this share grew to 13 percent,
while the share of answers mentioning frequent changes decreased to a still
substantial 86 percent form its 97 percent 1996 level. (See Table A2.5 of
the Appendix for further details.) As Figure 10 demonstrates, the share of
answers complaining that the extent of change of tax rules jeopardise the
reliability of the company’s business calculations diminished drastically
(nearly by half, to 36 percent from 71 percent) over the recent years. How-
ever, although the main frameworks of the tax system show reasonable
stability, and certain tax rates (corporate income tax, VAT) are also im-
pressively steady, in our view it would be difficult to tell whether the
changes of the tax rules indeed made the system less complicated, more
comprehensible and transparent. The complexity of the rules seems to have
increased. So we have to be cautious when interpreting the above opinion-
type results: they might reflect some positive changes in the tax system, but
they also might reflect more general changes in business climate and pros-
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pects. Also there is probably a learning process behind these results: enter-
prises simply could get used to the logic, the rules and the rate of changes
of a system that was considered overly complicated, difficult an unstable in
an earlier phase of the development of the market economy and the insti-
tutional system in Hungary.
Figure 10
 The impact of changes in the tax system
on business calculations, 1996–2001, percent
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share of firms complaining that frequent changes in the tax system threaten
sound business calculation
Opinions on tax rules, tax legislation also show an improving trend. The
share of answers finding tax legislation or tax forms overly complicated
diminished significantly: while in 1996 still 76 percent of the respondents
fully agreed with the first statement, and 57 percent with the second, by
2001 only a much lower percentage share (67 and 49 percent respectively)
shared this views. (See Table A2.6 of the Appendix for details.)
Opinions regarding the working of the tax authority also show some
gradual improvement (see Figure 11 below, and Table A2.6. of the Appen-
dix for the underlying data). Already the majority of company executives
agrees at least partially with the statement that tax authority informs busi-
nesses properly and in due time about their obligations (regarding dead-
lines of tax returns and tax payments, important changes etc.). Those defi-
nitely disagreeing with such a statement lost their majority (56 percent in
1996) somewhere between 1996 and 1998, and by 2001 the share of such
answers diminished to 38 percent. The importance of personal contacts (an
indirect indicator of the level of corruption) also seems to have diminished
somewhat according to the answers. However, still a very high share of ex-
ecutives think that personal contacts do matter at the tax authority when
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settling a tax dispute. The share of those fully agreeing with this statement
decreased by 2001 to 42 percent (by 10 percentage points from its 52 per-
cent level back in 1996), and although much of this decrease was absorbed
by the share of those partially agreeing (finding some truth in it), the inten-
sity of this opinion visibly diminished.
Figure 11
Opinions on the tax system and tax administration,
 1996-2001, percent
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 Note: All lines show “balance-type” statistics (the difference between ‘fully agrees’ and
‘definitely disagrees’ answers)
Right-hand scale  = the tax authority informs businesses properly and in due time;
Left-hand scale  = extremely complicated…; difficult to understand…; personal con-
tacts…;
These results indicate that the role of personal contacts (and, as a highly
likely consequence of these, corruption)16 is still rather significant, al-
                    
16 The logic of sociological research in latent phenomena indicates that answers to the
question on the role of personal contacts in tax disputes necessarily bear some direct
consequence to the incidence of corruption in tax administration. This can only mean
that those who have (good) personal contacts may expect better treatment or favour-
itism. The importance of such “personal contacts” can only be based in the long run
on some level of reciprocity. Those who want to rely on their personal contacts can-
not realistically expect selfless or altruistic behaviour from the other party, they must
also provide some recompense in return. The scope of such recompenses or counter-
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though probably less prevalent than 5-6 years ago. Such results do not im-
ply that those emphasising the role of personal contacts in tax disputes
necessarily based their opinion on their own personal experience or at least
on direct second-hand information on any such evidence supporting the
existence of corruption in the tax authority. However, even if rumours or
hearsay might have played an important role in forming these views, the
high level of acceptance of the importance of personal contacts indicate
some existence of corruption in the broad sense (including reciprocal fa-
vours). Even if we suppose (completely hypothetically, just for the sake of
making some simulation or sensitivity analysis) that only a relatively low 5
percent of those fully agreeing with the importance of personal contacts in
tax disputes paid actually some bribe in order to get favourable results or
better treatment from the tax authority, this implies that some 2 percent of
large and medium-size enterprises was directly involved in bribery to se-
cure special treatment from tax administration.- this would mean at least 70
enterprises in the selected sectors alone! Although it may be embarrassing
to acknowledge that corruption exists within the tax authority17 his may be,
we still want to emphasise that even if these results can be interpreted as an
indicator of corruption.
3. SOME CONCLUSIONS
Contractual fiscal and financial discipline all show visible improvement
during the 1996-2001 years. All the observed indicators of involvement in
the underground economy show some (sometimes substantial) decrease in
this involvement. According to the perception of the enterprises the inci-
dence of unreported sales diminished amongst their contractual partners
and competitors as well (although enterprises tend to think that their con-
tractual partners perform much better in this respect than their competi-
tors), and it also decreases in the whole Hungarian economy. This decrease
                                                                                                                                              
services may be very broad and varied, and might encompass minor favours within
the family or between friends, small personal gifts, and monetary rewards related to
corruption deals of a clearly illegal kind.
17 In the interviews conducted in 2000 with tax administration personnel, including
many people from the tax authority in important positions at local and national level,
the existence of such corruption was hardly ever acknowledged, was always regarded
as a marginal phenomenon. Corruption almost seemed to be a taboo topic for tax
administrators (see Semjén, 2001) These interviews are in a striking contrast with
corporate opinions.
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went parallel with the decrease of the negative influence of competitor
firms’ involvement in the black economy  on the domestic competitiveness
of the companies interviewed. Our estimation based on the so called ran-
domised response technique also suggests that a decrease has been likely
in the share of tax evading firms as well. These results are in accordance
with the results of our earlier tax research (especially Tóth and Semjén,
1998, strengthened by some macro evidence in Semjén, 2001), and fit
nicely to the results of other empirical research (Lackó, 2000, Sik, 2000,
and Tóth and Sik, 2002) on unofficial economic activities in Hungary.
The survey results show substantial improvement in corporate opinions
regarding tax policy and administration. Tax laws and rules are perceived
less complicated than earlier, and the public relations of the tax authority
are also rated better, the role of personal contacts in settling tax debates
decreased. The latter result also indicates that some positive change (de-
crease) in latent corruption in tax administration can also be considered
likely.
We can suppose that three factors were instrumental in the decrease of
the share of the black economy: (a) improving business climate and pros-
pects and (b) an increase in the level of integration of the Hungarian econ-
omy (and the country’s expected accession to EU) into the European econ-
omy, operating at a much lower level of involvement in the black econ-
omy18 (c) structural changes increasing the role of foreign ownership in the
Hungarian economy.
The positive effects of favourable business prospects on financial and
fiscal discipline and involvement in the black economy may be attributed
to a shift in the relative ratio of the expected net benefits from the legal and
                    
18 Any increase in the degree of the country’s integration into the European economy
will foster the decrease of the black economy (and our survey results show clearly
some obvious signs of this increasing integration, as both the share of firms produc-
ing for export and the share of these firms’ export revenues to their net sales in-
creased gradually over time). Owing to the high import intensity of Hungarian ex-
ports, on the input side there is little possibility for these firms to rely on the under-
ground sector and make unreported purchases. (The rules of VAT refund are also in-
strumental in this respect.) On the output side customs regulations and their enforce-
ment make large scale smuggling extremely difficult and thus practically exclude un-
reported export sales. As European competitors are likely to be less involved in hid-
den economy than the average Hungarian firm, in export markets there is also less
competitive pressure or incentive to „go black” than in the domestic market.
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the underground sector. Good business prospects, high GDP growth in-
crease the expected income from official economic activities. At the same
time there is a chance that the level of tax administration and tax audits
also improve (as economic growth provides more resources for the
strengthening of tax administration)19. Thus economic costs related to the
involvement in the underground sector must increase. According to some
standard models20 such a process in itself might ceteris paribus accelerate
the relative decrease of black economy. If economic growth can be coupled
with some decrease of the average tax burden on enterprises (and the
chance for this are obviously not that bad in a booming period) these two
factors together may lead to a significant reduction of expected net benefits
from involvement in the black economy.
All in all, our data from three different enterprise surveys unanimously
support the hypothesis that the importance of unofficial economic activity
of registered Hungarian medium and large enterprises radically dimin-
ished since 1996. As we also have information about the selected enter-
prise group’s opinion on the unofficial activities of their contractual part-
ners and main domestic competitors, our data enable us to generalise this
finding to the whole registered business sector In Hungary.
                    
19 Our earlier research on tax administration (see Semjén, 2001) showed growing inputs
and increasing professionalism in the field of tax audits in the 1990s; it was also
shown that audit probabilities also increased from 1996 on for the enterprise popula-
tion relevant for our present research.  At the same time tax arrears detected by these
tax audits (and, consequently,  public revenues from such audits) amounted to an in-
creasingly smaller portion of GDP between 1993 and 1997, then stabilised at a much
lower level then before.  The indicated decrease in the “efficiency” of tax audits (at
least if one can agree that increasing personnel, higher costs and some institutional
changes indicate some increase in the professionalism of administration) can be at-
tributed to some extent to the decreasing share of black economy.
20 See Allingham-Sandmo, 1972, Alm, 1998, Bowles, 1999, Klitgaard, 1988, Sandmo,
1981 and Yitzhaki, 1974
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A1. Testing the goodness of fit of our sample to the selected enterprise
population
When testing the goodness of fit of our sample we used the following H0 0-
hypothesis and H1 as an alternative hypothesis:
H0: P(Ci) = Pi,   i=1,2,....,k   (∑i=1,...k  Pi=1)
H1: P(Ci) ≠ Pi   for some i-s
where P(Ci) denotes the probability of (belonging to) the category Ci in the
sample (containing n elements), while
 Pi  is the probability of (belonging to) category Ci in the population.
The testing of H0 was based on the joint distribution of companies by sector and num-
ber of employees. The test used was a Chi-square test, where nPi  ≥ 5 must hold for the
number of observations in each cell. To execute the test one has to determine (for the
given degree of freedom and the selected confidence level) the (upper) critical χ21-α (v)
value, where  v is the degree of freedom  (v=k-1),  and α is the level of significance. We
will make the test at a 5 percent level of significance, i.e. at 0.95  probability.
Table A1.1
 Chi square test based on the joint distribution
of enterprises by sector and size (number of employees)
Categories
Observations Expec-
ted* dis-
tribution
Residual
Manufacturing, 1–99 employees 79 92.2 -13.2
Manufacturing, 100–249 employees 69 68.0    1.0
Manufacturing, 250– employees 57 49.4    7.6
Construction, 0–99 employees 31 23.7    7.3
Construction, 100–  employees   8 10.8   -2.8
Trade and comm., 0–99 employees 28 31.4   -3.4
Trade and comm., 100–249 employees 20 17.1    2.9
Trade and comm., 250– employees   8  7.5    0.5
Total 300 300 -
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Statistics
Chi- square 6.993
Degree of freedom 7
Significance 0.430
* expected distribution is based on the actual distribution in the enterprise population.
Note: with 3 sectors and 3 size categories we should have 9 categories altogether for the
joint distribution .However, owing to empty cells or cells where nPi  ≥ 5 did not hold,
this number was reduced to 8.
As the critical value  χ21-0.05 (7)= 14.1 is above the chi-square statistics in Table A1.1, we
can accept H0 at the selected level of significance. This means that the joint distributions
of the sample and the population can be considered the same at 0.95 probability level.
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A2. The distribution of enterprises in the sample according to some
variables
Table A2.1
Enterprise distributions by type of majority owner,
size and the ratio of exports to net sales in the three surveys
Variable Categories 1996 1998 2001
Type of majority owners*
(Individual or corporate) foreign o. 19.1 20.7 27.8
Hungarian individual o. 37.5 42.4 42.8
Domestic corporate owner 20.1 20.8 19.4
Public sector (central or local gov-
ernment)
13.3  6.6   4.3
Mixed o.**   9.9  9.5   5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 293 300 299
Company size (number of employees)
– 100  43.1  41.8 44.8
101 – 200  26.6  30.5 26.3
201 – 300  11.4  12.3 13.8
301 –  19.0  15.4 15.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 290 295 297
Ratio of export revenues to net sales, percent
Zero 45.7   42.6 33.7
0.01-20 27.0   18.5 19.9
20.01-50 12.3   12.9 15.2
50.01- 15.0   26.0 31.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 293 300 297
Sales for export
Yes 54.6 61.2 65.3
No 45.4 38.8 34.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 293 300 291
Average share of export revenues in net sales for companies with sales for export
Average share (percent) 33.9 45.8 48.3
N 159 178 190
*: Type of majority  owner(s) is determined upon the capital share of owner(s) belong-
ing to a given ownership category. If this share in the company’s capital assets ex-
ceeds 50 percent for any given type of owner(s), then that type of owner(s) is consid-
ered the type of majority owner(s).
** If no type has a capital share exceeding 50 percent, the company is categorised as one
with mixed ownership (no majority owner).
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Table A2.2
 Changes in employment levels and the ratio
 of fringe benefits to total wage cost
Variables Categories 1996 1998 2001
Employment (number of employees) compared to previous year
Decreased by 20 percent or more 13.6 – –
Decreased by less than 20 percent 43.7 – –
Did not change 17.8 – –
Increased by less than 20 percent 19.6 – –
Increased by 20 percent or more   5.2 – –
Decreased 57.3   37.1 35.5
Did not change 17.8   16.6 26.7
Increased 24.8   46.3 37.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 292 300 296
Ratio of fringe benefits to total wage cost*
Less than 5 percent  61.5  48.2  51.6
5 percent or more  38.5  51.8  48.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 278 281 275
* Total wage cost includes gross wages and social security contributions borne by the
employer.
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Table A2.3
 Changes in the discipline of payments, 1996-2001, percent
1996 1998 2001
Did it occur in the last 12 months that the company could not meet its
contractual payment obligations to other businesses in time?
No   83.3 90.2   95.0
Yes   16.7   9.8     5.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 293 298 301
Did the company have any delay in the payment of social security
contributions over the last 12 months?
Yes   17.7    6.8   13.6
No   82.3   93.2   86.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 293 299 301
Did it ever happen during the last two years that a tax obligation
 was not paid in due time?
Yes   38.7   27.1 23.0* (12.3)
No   61.3   72.9 77.0* (87.7)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 293 296 300
* 2001 data for tax arrears are not fully comparable with the earlier ones as they also in-
clude social security contribution arrears over the last two years. Data in parentheses
refer to tax arrears only but not on a two year but a 12-month time span. If the rele-
vant data were fully comparable with the earlier ones the improvement might have
been somewhat more pronounced than it appears in the table.
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Table A2.4
 The incidence of unreported sales
(some aspects of participation in the black economy)
1996-2001, percent
1996 1998 2001
Unreported sales amongst your contractual partners…
never occur 79.8 80.7 83.0
(are) rare 13.7 14.6 13.5
(are) frequent  6.5   4.7   3.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 277 286 288
Unreported sales in the Hungarian economy
never occur -   1.2 2.2
(are) rare   10.6  18.4 32.7
(are) frequent   89.4  81.4 65.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 274 272 269
Unreported sales amongst your domestic competitors
never occur 43.1 45.0 58.5
(are) rare 23.6 25.2 20.3
(are) frequent 33.3 29.8 21.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 195 218 217
To what extent has your domestic competitors’ involvement
in the black economy (as buyers or sellers) an influence
on your company’s competitive position?
No influence at all   28.8   38.5   49.5
Influence to small extent   31.0   27.9   31.5
Influence to great extent   40.2   33.6   19.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 271 276 279
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Table A2.5
Changes in corporate opinions regarding taxes
and the tax system, 1996-2001, percent
1996 1998 2001
Tax rules in Hungary
are stable and change rarely –  0.5   1.0
change only when necessary    3.1  4.6 13.1
change frequently   96.9 94.9 85.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 292 298 298
Does the extent of change of tax rules jeopardise the
reliability of your company’s business calculations?
No  28.8  48.5 64.4
Yes  71.2  51.5 35.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 293 299 295
To what extent do(es) ……… jeopardise the
competitiveness of your company (in export
markets) (1 – to a great extent. 5 – not at all)
Average ratings
Social security contributions 1.87 2.12 2.74
Personal Income Tax 2.96 3.12 3.08
Value Added Tax 3.17 3.39 3.67
Corporate income tax 4.38 3.59 3.36
Local taxes 4.45 3.80 3.55
Customs and duties - - 3.40
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Table A2.6
 Corporate opinions on the tax system and administration,
1996-2001, percent
Y e a rStatement Corporate opinion
1996 1998 2001
Tax legislation is so complicated that even
professional accountants find it difficult to handle
fully agrees 75.7 78.2 67.3
finds some truth in it 21.2 20.0 29.3
definitely disagrees 3.1 1.8 3.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 292 298 300
Many tax forms are difficult to understand
fully agrees 57.2 63.8 49.0
finds some truth in it 30.8 27.7 38.7
definitely disagrees 12.0 8.5 12.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 292 295 300
Personal contacts do matter at the tax authority
 when settling a tax dispute
fully agrees 52.3 50.5 42.2
finds some truth in it 33.0 34.9 38.6
definitely disagrees 14.7 14.6 19.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 279 278 277
Tax authority informs businesses properly
and in due time about their obligations
fully agrees 11.3 13.3 19.0
finds some truth in it 33.0 39.2 42.5
definitely disagrees 55.7 47.5 38.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 291 296 294
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A3. Estimating the share of tax evading firms
Needless to say once more that tax evasion cannot be observed and esti-
mated directly: One cannot ask a direct question in a survey concerning
such a delicate issue and expect the respondent to give a sincere answer.
Obviously, some indirect and more sophisticated method must be chosen.
The randomised response technique was used here. This technique allows
the researcher to estimate the true frequency of replies to especially deli-
cate survey questions (such as questions on unconventional sexual behav-
iour, AIDS infection, drug abuse, or for that matter. tax fraud)  in a sample
and use the methods of statistical inference to arrive at valid statements for
the population the sample was selected from. This way delicate issues may
be successfully analysed using survey data.
The method is based on the following: the respondent is given a pack of
cards. Each card contains one of two opposite statements (one admitting
and one denying the unobservable behaviour or characteristic: in our case
one statement admitted and the other denied that the enterprise ever com-
mitted tax evasion or tax fraud over the last two years). The respondent is
then asked to shuffle and draw a card randomly and tell the interviewer.
without letting him know what the statement on the card actually was.
whether the statement is true or false in his case. The proportion of admis-
sion (p) and denial cards (1-p) must be determined beforehand in such way
that p must not be equal to 0.5; in our surveys p= 0.7 was used. The tech-
nique allows the researcher to determine the incidence of the studied hid-
den phenomenon in the population using an estimator based on the relative
frequencies of “true” and “false” answers and the given share of cards
containing the admission statement21.
The estimator of tax evasion rate (TER) can accordingly be determined
by the following formula:
 T E R
p
X n p=
−
+ −
1
2 1
1 1( / ) ( )
 where TER is the estimated rate of tax evading businesses,
p is the share of cards admitting tax fraud, 
                    
21 For a more detailed description of the method and the mathematics of the estimator,
see Särndal et al., 1992.
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n  is sample size (number of enterprises in the sample),
and X is the number of "true" answers to this question.
The variance of this estimator can be calculated according to the fol-
lowing formula:
 V tax evasion rate
p
f
n
X
n
X
n
p p N( )
( )
( ( )) ( ) / ( )=
−
−
−
− + −
1
2 1
1
1
1 1 22
 where V(TER) is the estimated variance of the share of tax evading
businesses,
 N is the size of (enterprise) population from which the sample was drawn,
 and f is n/N.
Knowing the estimator and its variance will allow us to determine the
mean and a confidence interval for the population at a given significance
level: based on this we can arrive at conclusions on the frequency of tax
evasion in the selected enterprise population.
In our surveys each card contained one of the following two statements:
A1: “During the last two years of the company’s operation the company
committed tax evasion (evaded some taxes).”
(p = 0.7)
A2: “During the last two years of the company’s operation the company
never committed tax evasion (did not evade taxes).”
(p = 0.3)
Answers could be “True” or “False”.
In our 1998 survey the estimated rate of tax evasion was 8.8 per cent,
and the estimated variance allowed us to estimate a ± 14 per cent 95 per-
cent confidence interval. As the rate of tax evasion cannot be negative,
these results suggested that the true rate of tax evasion in the enterprise
population surveyed fell in the (0; 22.8) percent interval with a 8.8 per cent
mean with 95 percent probability. (Cf. Tóth and Semjén, 1998.) These re-
sults suggest that probably there existed some tax evasion in 1998, how-
ever, at 95 percent probability level the data would not allow us to exclude
even the – rather unlikely – case of complete tax compliance in the studied
population.
For 2001 the above estimation led to somewhat strange results: we got a
slightly negative mean share of tax evading firms, as out of the 289 an-
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swers only 78 (27 percent) were “True” while 211 (73 percent) were
“False”.
As the number of cards acknowledging tax evasion was 7 out of 10, and
cards denying it numbered to 3 respectively, the true share of “true” an-
swers must have been at least 30 percent22 if the cards were drawn per-
fectly randomly, all answers were honest and the sample size was big
enough for the laws of probability to hold. Given the observed values of
“True” and “False” answers, the resulting mean share of tax evading firms
from formula (1) became negative. However, with such small sample size
an estimated negative mean, just slightly outside the theoretically meaning-
ful [0; 1] range, does not necessarily indicate any problem, and the result-
ing interval estimation (after omitting the  negative values) still could be
meaningful23.
Although we saw that an observed share of “True” answers below the
theoretically true minimum (in our case 30 percent) does not necessarily
indicate a “technical” problem (e. g. not perfectly random draw) or dishon-
est answers (due to improper interview situation24), still we wanted to dou-
                    
22 Provided that there was absolutely no evasion in the sample and everybody answered
honestly, the true theoretical share of “True” answers must be 30 percent. In such a
case those drawing card A1 must answer “False” (as they did not evade taxes), while
those drawing A2 must answer “Yes” (as the card they drew implied the truth, i.e.
that they did not evade taxes either). If the sample is big enough and the card draws
are perfectly random, the actual estimated value must be reasonably close to this
theoretical value according to the laws of probability theory and the law of great
numbers. In the other extreme situation, where all companies evade taxes, the true
share of “True” answers equals 70 percent (as everyone receiving card A1 should an-
swer “Yes”, while the true share of “False” answers must be 30 percent). As in any
case “True” and “False” answers are the only possible options, the theoretically true
range for the share of any of the two possible answers must be the [0.3; 0.7] interval.
However, if the sample size is relatively small, the actual realisation of card draws
(the share of cards acknowledging or denying tax evasion) does not necessarily ap-
proximate very closely the theoretical probabilities, as the preconditions required for
the validity of the law of great numbers do not hold (n does not tend to infinity). Thus
observed frequencies can easily fall outside the theoretically correct interval.
23 As 300 is fairly small as compared to infinity, we cannot expect the observed frequen-
cies to be very close to the theoretically true probability values, so such minor dis-
crepancies might be explained and tolerated.
24 Dishonest answers can occur if some of the interviewers failed to create a proper in-
terview situation by making the respondent understand that he (the interviewer) will
not have any direct information regarding the respondent’s tax compliance or evasion
from the answer to this special card-question. This might have been the case if the
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blecheck if all interviews were conducted properly and cards were drawn
randomly25. Checking the data by interviewers we found that there were
some suspect interviewers with a strangely patterned distribution of “True”
and “False” answers in their respective sub-samples26. WE could suspect
that in these cases this second type of error (due to the lack of shuffling)
might have been occurred, provided that the vast majority was compliant
and tax evaders were distributed randomly amongst interviewers. So, when
estimating the share of tax evading firms, we finally decided to leave out
all answers (altogether 44 cases) from companies interviewed by these
suspect interviewers.
Thus the observed share of “True” and “False” answers already fell be-
tween the theoretically acceptable boundaries. The  31 percent share of
“True” and the 68 percent share of “False” answers imply that the mean
share of tax  evading firms can be estimated according the method de-
scribed above at 2.5 percent with 95 percent level of confidence. This and
the variance of the estimator computed according to (2) allow us to make
an interval estimation: the share of tax evading firms must fall into the
2.5±14.1 percent interval at a 95 percent level of confidence. On the other
hand the share of tax evading firms cannot be negative under any circum-
stances, thus the share of tax evading firms should fall into the (0, 16.6)
interval with 95 percent probability. This means that the maximum per-
centage share (incidence) of tax evading firms in 2001 can be estimated (at
a 95 percent level confidence) at 16,6 percent27, while in 1998 this maxi-
mum value was much higher, 22.8 percent. The 2.5 percent mean for 2001 is
also much smaller then the 8.8 estimated in 1998. Thus our results indicate
that the share of tax evading firms probably decreased somewhat during the
1998–2001 years.
                                                                                                                                              
interviewer did not show the cards with the two different statements to the respon-
dents before shuffling and drawing, and thus the respondent could not be sure
whether the cards indeed differed from each other as had been stated.
25 Besides the relatively small sample size another possible explanation for observed
values outside the true theoretical range can be that some of the interviewers did not
shuffle the cards before asking the respondent to draw one. If this was the case, re-
spondents did not draw randomly, and this might have seriously distorted the fre-
quencies  of “True” and “False” answers.
26 We found 5 interviewers who nearly always got “False” answers only. (Out of 44
cases they got only 2 “True” answers altogether as compared to 42 “False” answers.)
27 If our suspicions regarding the “suspect” interviewers proved groundless or unfounded, the maximum
possible share of tax evading firms would be even smaller that this estimation.
